Bernard Spiegal

Is it too far out of left field to suggest that Israel is crumbling? That the manifestations of its seeming military prowess’ now yet again being visited on Gaza, but also in the West Bank, are actually the gasps of a wounded and failing entity?

When a country goes to war, it’s generally expected that the nation as a whole gets behind the action, whatever misgivings sections of the population may have had prior to the commencement of military action.

Not so for Israel. The murderous, clearly genocidal, action now unleashed on Gaza is not supported by a significant – many thousands – part of the population. Indeed, the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are alive with mass protests against Israel’s renewed assaults. True, this seemingly pacific orientation is not born out of care for Palestinians as such, but on the pragmatic grounds that Israeli hostages held by Hamas are in peril, either from Israeli bombs and missiles or Hamas action against them.

The question is, to what extent do the tensions underlying Israel’s war on Gaza represent, in microcosm, conflicts inherent in wider Israeli society.

Inherent fault lines

Israel’s fault lines are built into the very foundations of the state, hence the tendency to fracture. This arises in part from the very nature of the Zionist enterprise. It has no internal coherence.

Israel is in the grip of political and popular forces that push and pull it ever further towards being an avowedly theocratic, ethno-religious state. This is in stark contrast to its founding ethos. Historically, the initial political Zionist impulse was to create a state that was both secular and socialist. Secular here meaning Jewish-secular. An exclusionary construct.

But secular and socialist ideals were insufficient justifications for colonising, by violence and threat of violence, Palestinian land. So, in a virtuoso performance of oxymoronic excess, secular Zionism rested its claim to the land of Palestine on a religious text: the God-infused Jewish bible, the Tanakh.

Resting on this shacky, unstable secular-religious fusion, Israel went about its state-building enterprise. On the one-hand secular, on the other religious. Over the years, ultra-religious and extreme right-wing forces increased their grip on the Israeli state, made manifest in a rampant zealotry, opposed to secular Jews, as much as to Palestinians.

Conceptualising Israel society: an aid

Ilan Pappe, in a paper – which should really be read in full – for Sidecar, characterises the ‘fracturing of Israeli Jewish Society’ by conceptualising on the one hand, a State of Israel; and, on the other, a ‘State of Judea’. They are mutually exclusive; they can find little of no common ground to settle on.

The ‘State of Israel’ ‘comprises more secular, liberal and mostly, but not exclusively, middle-class European Jews and their descendants, who were instrumental in establishing the state. They remained hegemonic within it until the end of the last century.’ ‘Liberal’ here is not what we customarily understand by the term. In the Israeli context, it means the exclusion of Palestinians by way of expulsion or discriminatory measures. The State of Israel rests firmly on the wobbly ground of an oxymoron: that it can be both Jewish and Democratic.

In the opposite corner to the State of Israel, stands the ‘State of Judea’. It ‘developed among the settlers of the occupied West Bank. It enjoys increasing levels of support within the country… Its influence in the upper echelons of the Israeli army and security services is growing exponentially.’

Pappe continues, ‘the State of Judea wants Israel to become a theocracy that stretches over the entirety of historical Palestine’. It is determined to reduce the number of Palestinians to a bare minimum and contemplates construction of a Third Temple in place of al-Aqsa. ‘For them, secular Jews are as heretical as the Palestinians if they refuse to join in this endeavour.’

The fractured nature of Israeli society, runs deep. The symptoms of its diseased state increasingly coming to the fore. Again, from Pappe, he highlights a number of symptoms of the ill-health – which in time may well be terminal – of Israeli society.

The symptoms include: the parlous state of the Israeli economy ‘In the final quarter of last year, the economy slumped by nearly 20%; since then, the recovery has been fragile.

And in a demonstration, were one needed, that money has no home country, no loyalty to anything outside itself, some of the economic and financial elite have moved their capital outside the state.

In addition, ‘more than half a million Israelis…have left the country since October, an indication that the country is being engulfed by the State of Judea’. This is particularly telling for a state that has so much focused on encouraging diaspora Jews to immigrate to Israel, this underpinned by the quasi-mystical valorising of the concept of ‘aliyah’ – ‘going up’ or ‘ascending’ – the implication being that Jewish – no-one else! – immigrants to Israel will enter a heavenly, secure space.

Pappe goes on to highlight Israel’s growing isolation, certainly among the people of the world, as distinct from the elites that rule them. However, of particular interest in terms of this article is Pappe’s referencing weaknesses in the IDF.

Weakness of the IDF: Orthodox Jews

The reference to weaknesses in the IDF is quite telling, not least because the IDF plays such a pivotal role in Israel’s conception of itself.

Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph, in ‘Beyond the Iron Wall: The Fatal Flaw in Israel’s National Security’ points to the potential negative consequences of the land army having a high proportion of orthodox and ultra-orthodox – committed to a State of Judea – Jewish soldiers in their ranks.

Following the events of 7 October 2023, the army was, he says, highly motivated, but also vengeful. As a consequence, questions arise about the ‘forces’ levels of discipline and of professionalism, ranging from the wearing of “Messiah” badges…to serious and unnecessary strikes on the civilian population in some cases at the initiative of high-ranking commanders.’

Bar-Joseph suggests that cases such as these ‘reflect the growing influence of the national-religious right on the spirit of the IDF.’ As more right-wing, religious officers ‘rise to top positions, and the power of the military rabbinate grows, messianic trends are likely to burgeon in the IDF across all the levels of command’.

Bar-Joseph goes on to ask how and whether an increased number of orthodox and ultra-orthodox soldiers will affect the character of the army and its ability to cope with modernity. If such constituencies come to dominate the IDF, this could affect the willingness of non-Orthodox young people to serve.

‘Already, an inherent tension is being forged between the ability of female soldiers to serve in meaningful positions, and the exclusionary demands that will be required in response to the draft of yeshiva students.’

Indicators presaging collapse

If the IDF is considering the very nature of its existence, is uncertain about its ethos and how it should be configured in readiness for future needs – those needs in themselves the subject of contention – this bodes ill for Israeli society as a whole, which is wracked with division. Israel’s armed forces is a conscript, citizens’ army, therefore the politics and pressures afflicting the wider polity will be reflected within the ranks of the IDF, and vice versa.

The government of Benjamin Netanyahu, now with Ben-Gvir, a rampant anti-Palestinian racist, within the governing coalition bodes ill for Israel, certainly for those aligned to the State of Israel perspective. This constituency has been under sustained assault from the State of Judea, which along with its objective of ridding Greater Israel of Palestinians, is intent on overturning current constitutional arrangements. This in order to entrench a religious, ethnonationalist hegemony from the river to the sea.

We cannot know whether Israel will face a process of gradual decline, or a precipitous fall from grace. Unplanned, unanticipated events can, sans warning, assail any polity.

We cannot know when Israel will implode, nor the exact form it will take. What we can say, however, is that much hurt, death and damage will accompany its descent.